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sold drugs from their apartment.
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1. United States v. 121 Nostrand Ave., 760 F. Supp. 1015, 1018 (E.D.N.Y. 1991)
(finding, in a pre-Rucker decision, that a leaseholder's lack of knowledge of a family
member's drug activity allowed her to escape eviction from public housing).
299
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER r LAW
1. INTRODUCTION
Pearlie Rucker, sixty-three years old, had been living in public
housing in Oakland, California for thirteen years. Ms. Rucker lived with
her mentally disabled adult daughter, Gelinda, as well as two grandchil-
dren and one great-grandchild. Ms. Rucker regularly searched Gelinda's
room for signs of drugs, and had warned Gelinda that any drug activity
on the premises could result in eviction. Nevertheless, Gelinda was
caught with drugs three blocks from the apartment. Despite the fact
that Ms. Rucker had no knowledge of Gelinda's drug activity, and in fact
had been carefully monitoring what happened in her apartment, the
Oakland Housing Authority (OHA) took steps to evict Ms. Rucker.2
Ms. Rucker and others brought suit in Federal District Court to
challenge the actions of the OHA and the Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD). Eventually, the Supreme Court of the
United States, in the 2002 case Department ofHousing and Urban Devel-
opment v. Rucker, held that the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 19883 requires
lease terms that give public housing authorities (PHAs) the discretion to
evict tenants for the drug-related activity of any household members and
guests. The Court held that PHAs have the power to evict regardless of
whether a tenant knew or should have known about the drug-related
activity.' This one-strike policy has been widely criticized as unfair to
public housing leaseholders, since it has the potential to devastate them,
even if they have not engaged in any drug activity, and even if they had
no knowledge of the drug activity of household members and guests.
The Rucker decision has also prompted significant discussion among
lawyers and academics about ways to alter or challenge the policy to en-
sure that tenants are not treated in an unfair and draconian way.'
Given the statistics and social science research indicating that low
and very low income households are often female-headed,' it is very
likely that the Rucker decision weighs most heavily on poor and minor-
ity women. These women probably constitute a large majority of the
leaseholders who find themselves evicted from public housing under its
rule. If the statistics prove this to be true, it may be possible to invalidate
the applicable portion of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act, along with the
2. Rucker v. Davis, No. C 98-00781 CRB, 1998 WL 345403, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June
19, 1998).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(1)(6) (2006).
4. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 130 (2002).
5. Rucker, 535 U.S. at 130.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 21-38.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 52-53.
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HUD regulations that enforce it," based on sex discrimination under the
Fair Housing Act (FHA).9 Alternatively, for PHAs that evict a dispro-
portionate number of female leaseholders, FHA lawsuits could force
those authorities to be fairer and more measured in their application of
the policy.
II. THE LAW
In the late 1980s, Congress was concerned that drug abuse and
drug-related activities were contributing to high crime rates in public
housing, creating unsafe conditions for residents and a management
nightmare for PHAs. 0 As a result, Congress included in the Anti-Drug
Abuse Act of 1988 the following provision:
Each public housing agency shall utilize leases which . . . pro-
vide that any criminal activity that threatens the health, safety,
or right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other ten-
ants or any drug-related criminal activity on or off such
premises, engaged in by a public housing tenant, any member
of the tenant's household, or any guest or other person under
the tenant's control, shall be cause for termination of tenancy."
HUD has issued regulations administering this Act that closely track the
language of the statute:
The lease must provide that drug-related criminal activity en-
gaged in on or off the premises by any tenant, member of the
tenant's household or guest, and any such activity engaged in
on the premises by any other person under the tenant's con-
trol, is grounds for the PHA to terminate tenancy. In addition,
the lease must provide that a PHA may evict a family when
the PHA determines that a household member is illegally us-
ing a drug or when the PHA determines that a pattern of
8. 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(1)(5)(i)(B) (2008).
9. Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2006).
10. Paul Stinson, Restoring Justice: How Congress Can Amend the One-Strike Laws in Fed-
erally-Subsidized Public Housing to Ensure Due Process, Avoid Inequity, and Combat
Crime, 11 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 435, 436-37 (2004) (citing Anti-Abuse
Drug Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, sec. 5122, 102 Stat. 4181, 4301 (1988)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 11901 (2006))).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(1)(6) (2006).
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illegal use of a drug interferes with the health, safety, or right
to peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other residents.12
The HUD regulations give PHAs faced with a violation of such a
lease term the option to consider all the circumstances of a case. These
circumstances include:
the seriousness of the offending action, the extent of participa-
tion by the leaseholder in the offending action, the effects that
the eviction would have on family members not involved in
the offending activity and the extent to which the leaseholder
has shown personal responsibility and has taken all reasonable
steps to prevent or mitigate the offending action.13
HUD further grants PHAs the discretion to consider, if they choose,
options other than eviction to remedy any perceived problems with
drugs. These options include excluding the culpable household member
and facilitating rehabilitation for the culpable household member."
Prior to the Supreme Court's consideration of the issue in Rucker in
2002, courts had disagreed about whether an evicted leaseholder must
have had knowledge of the drug activity in question in order for the
eviction to be valid. A number of courts had held that due process re-
quired a showing that the tenant did in fact have such knowledge."
Despite this, the Supreme Court unanimously held in Rucker that a ten-
ant's knowledge of the drug activity at issue was not required. 6 The
Court dismissed the idea that there might be a due process violation
inherent in these no-fault evictions, and insisted that the government
merely acts as a landlord, not as a "sovereign," when it evicts tenants and
deprives them of property." The Court went on to state that no "ab-
surd" (or, presumably, unfair) results would come from its reading of the
statute, since that reading does not require eviction when third-party
drug activity is discovered, but instead gives PHAs the discretion to de-
cide whether eviction is appropriate.' In spite of the Court's emphasis
on discretion and HUD's specific allowance for alternatives to eviction,
12. 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(l)(5)(i)(B) (2008).
13. § 966.4(l)(5)(vii)(B).
14. § 966.4(l)(5)(vii)(C)-(D).
15. Caroline Castle, You Call That A Strike? A Post-Rucker Examination of Eviction From
Public Housing Due to Drug-Related Criminal Activity of a Third Party, 37 GA. L.
REv. 1435, 1437-38 (2003).
16. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 130 (2002).
17. Rucker, 535 U.S. at 135.
18. Rucker, 535 U.S. at 133-34.
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no-fault eviction cases in which innocent tenants are unfairly forced out
of their homes still occur. Further, courts generally uphold the decisions
of PHAs because the law allows the authorities to choose whether to con-
sider factors that might counsel against evicting an entire family." A
PHA's choice not to consider mitigating factors is entirely legal and does
not invalidate an eviction.
III. CRITICISMS OF THE RUCKER DECISION
The Rucker decision has been widely criticized as unfair and unreal-
istic. One major problem with the decision is that, while the Court
emphasizes the discretion of PHAs (and in fact relies heavily on that
discretion to support its decision 20), it by no means requires any actual
exercise of discretion. 2' As a result, there is no safety valve in place to
ensure that evictions under Rucker are fairly executed. Further, there are
actually incentives in place that encourage PHAs to automatically evict
tenants who violate the terms of their leases. PHAs are assessed, scored,
and punished22 by HUD based partly on their implementation of
"tough ... resident eviction policies and procedures" and documenta-
tion that they "appropriately evict" residents who violate the drug and
criminal activity lease provisions. PHAs may interpret this "appropriate
eviction" portion of the HUD regulations to require eviction of tenants
in violation of their leases. Even if PHAs interpret it to mean that they
retain discretion, they will likely prefer to evict where there is a violation
21
rather than to risk a lower assessment score.
Another criticism is that the Rucker Court adopted HUD's defini-
tion that a person is under a tenant's control when the tenant has
permitted that person access to the premises. 25 Thus, an entire house-
hold could be evicted because a one-time visitor, whom the tenant
19. Castle, supra note 15, at 1440.
20. Rucker, 535 U.S. at 133-34 (explaining that the statute does not create absurd re-
sults, since it does not require PHAs to evict tenants, but rather entrusts the decision
to the individual PHA, which is in the best position to take account of the entire
situation).
21. Rucker, 535 U.S. at 133-34.
22. PHAs that do not score well on assessments will continue to receive federal oversight
and may fail to qualify for certain forms of funding. Nelson H. Mock, Punishing the
Innocent: No-Fault Eviction of Public Housing Tenants for the Actions of Third Parties,
76 TEx. L. REv. 1495, 1503 (1998).
23. Castle, supra note 15, at 1452-53 (citing 24 C.F.R. § 901.45 (2002)).
24. Id.
25. See Rucker, 535 U.S. at 131.
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barely knew, went home and used drugs.26 In fact, the Rucker decision
made clear that mere association with drug users can be sufficient
grounds to evict a tenant from her home. Given the near universal prox-
imity of public housing to drug activity, it can be very difficult for a
tenant to avoid violating her lease in this way at some point during her
27
occupancy.
In addition, the effects of no-fault evictions are stark, as leasehold-
ers are not permitted to re-enter public housing for three years after an
eviction occurs. 28 Evicted tenants cannot afford market-rate housing,
and, without the safety net of public housing, they are usually forced
into homelessness.29 Various authors have argued that, given the severity
of this consequence, the complete lack of due process afforded to lease-
holders facing eviction is particularly egregious.30 Equally problematic is
the fact that, in order to evict, a PHA need only "determine" that there
has been a drug-related violation of the terms of a lease. The person who
engaged in the drug activity at issue need not have been arrested or con-
victed based on the alleged events, and the standard of proof required
for a criminal conviction need not be met.31 In fact, HUD's Public
Housing Occupancy Guidebook states only that "[s]ome sort of evi-
dence is required.3 2
There has also been significant criticism that the HUD policy re-
garding drug-related evictions, along with the Rucker decision, is
particularly unfair to women, both because single mothers are probably
affected most often by the policy and also because deeply embedded
stereotypes affect PHAs' treatment of female tenants. "Chief among
those adversely impacted by the campaign have been poor single minor-
ity female heads of household, often senior citizens, who are living with
their actual or adopted offspring, one or more of whom, usually an ado-
26. Stinson, supra note 10, at 448.
27. Id. at 445.
28. Screening of Applicants for Federally Assisted Housing, 42 U.S.C. § 13661(a)
(2006).
29. Stinson, supra note 10, at 472 (citing United States v. 121 Nostrand Ave., 760 F.
Supp. 1015, 1018 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) ("[Public Housing] [t]enants-and especially
their minor children-who are evicted are likely to become homeless, with whatever
stability their lives afforded seriously jeopardized.")).
30. Id. at 436 ("The federal law as currently interpreted not only allows the immediate
withdrawal of this crucial property interest, but has virtually eliminated any meaning-
ful opportunity for these people to be heard, to defend themselves against the
charges, or to ask for relief.").
31. 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(l)(5)(iii)(A) (2008).
32. Stinson, supra note 10, at 450 (citing U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEv., PUBLIC
HOUSING OcCUPANCY GUIDEBOOK 204 (2003), http:// www.hud.gov/offices/pih/
programs/ph/rhiip/phguidebooknew.pdf).
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lescent or young adult male child or grandchild, sells or possesses
drugs."" The Rucker Court has essentially required public housing
leaseholders to eject their children from their homes when they discover
the children's drug activity, in order to avoid a potential eviction. This
phenomenon has been labeled an "assault" on the values of women who
believe that they are responsible for their children and want to use their
homes to protect them, especially when those children are coming in
contact with drugs.34 Further, a report by the American Civil Liberties
Union has explained that even if women would be willing to kick out
family members for known drug use, "courts have penalized women,
notwithstanding their lack of any involvement in criminal activity, for
their failure to meet unreasonable, and in some cases unattainable, stan-
dards of control in their relationships with those close to them.""
At least one author has asserted that the policy was motivated in
large part by a desire to "control the behavior of the stereotypical welfare
mother who is full of excuses for her progeny and always ready to over-
look their shortcomings where drugs are concerned, out of an
abundance of misguided maternalism."" Another author, Mairi N.
Morrison, has explained that the stereotyping of poor, black mothers
plays a large role at the point where a woman is trying to defend herself
and escape an eviction. Morrison notes that two competing stereotypes
can make it nearly impossible to convince a PHA to exercise its discre-
tion and allow a mother to remain in her home when she truly had no
33. Regina Austin, "Step on a Crack, Break Your Mother's Back'" Poor Moms, Myths of
Authority, and Drug Related Evictions from Public Housing, 14 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM
273, 275 (2002).
34. Austin, supra note 33, at 286.
35. See AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (ACLU) ET AL., CAUGHT IN THE NET: THE IMPACT
OF DRUG POLICIES ON WOMEN AND FAMILIES 37-38 (2005),
http://www.aclu.org/images/asset-upload-file393_23513.pdf. The report goes on to
explain that the government
failts] to take into consideration the reasons why a woman may remain si-
lent or fall short of a court's standard for assertiveness in the face of a
partner or family member's drug related activity. Ignored are factors like
domestic violence, economic dependence, disability that makes one reliant
on others to provide support or medical care, and immigration status
linked to marriage. Women are also penalized for supporting spouses and
family members seeking help for drug addictions, instead of turning them
over to the criminal justice system.
Id. at 38. See also Madeline Howard, Subsidized Housing Policy: Defining the Family,
22 BERKELEY J. OF GENDER L. & JUST. 97, 117-21 (2007) ("Unlike the Rucker plain-
tiffs, caregivers who can afford private housing can react to the criminal behavior of a
child with the discipline they feel is appropriate, and assist the child in making better
choices.").
36. Austin, supra note 33, at 286.
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knowledge or control over a child's involvement with drugs." On the
one hand, these women are presumed to have knowledge of the drug
use, but are also presumed to be powerless to fix it. This is precisely why
PHAs feel that a strict liability no-fault eviction policy is required." On
the other hand, these women are seen as strong, powerful black matri-
archs who must have not only had knowledge of the drug-related
activity, but must also have been the brains behind the operation." Mor-
rison insists that the unfairness of the no-fault policy is even more
profound for poor, black single mothers than for other public housing
residents, since deeply embedded stereotypes keep PHAs from exercising
their discretion in favor of these tenants even when they are clearly in-
40
nocent.
IV. SOME PROPOSED STRATEGIES TO CHALLENGE OR REFORM
THE FEDERAL NO-FAULT EviCTION POLICY
Due to widespread frustration with the federal no-fault eviction
policy, lawyers and policymakers have been coming up with ideas about
how to challenge or alter the policy. Some potential policy changes in-
clude the addition of an innocent owner defense, akin to that used in
civil forfeiture cases, as well as the application of a negligence standard
to drug-related evictions." Another possibility is a modification of the
HUD regulations, or of individual PHAs' rules, to require PHAs to con-
sider the particular circumstances of a case, including whether a tenant
had knowledge or control of the drug-related events, whether social ser-
vices would be helpful in the situation, and what the consequences of
eviction would be for the tenant and her family.4 2 Given that legislative
change often happens quite slowly, the fastest and most comprehensive
route to reform in this area is to bring a case against the United States or
HUD to challenge the no-fault policy directly. Local cases against indi-
vidual PHAs to require fair implementation of the policy would also be
effective.
37. Mair N. Morrison, The Knowledge/Power Dilemma and the Myth of the Supermother:
A Critique of the Innocent Owner Defense in Narcotics Forfeiture of the Family Home, 7
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 55, 59 (1997).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 73-78.
41. Mock, supra note 22, at 1525.
42. Stinson, supra note 10, at 478-79 (pointing out that such a scheme has been imple-
mented effectively in Oakland County, California).
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It has been suggested that a substantive due process challenge under
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution may be a
good legal mechanism to challenge the policy. A tenant facing eviction
could argue that her eviction amounts to a deprivation of property for
an irrational and invidious purpose." Proponents of this route argue
that it could be effective, because the Supreme Court has held that pub-
lic housing leaseholders have a property interest in the continued
occupancy of their homes, and because there is something fundamen-
tally unfair-and thus irrational and invidious-about punishing an
innocent person." The problem with such an approach is that it would
only address individual cases after an eviction proceeding had already
begun-it would not address the overall policy problem.
Author Paul Stinson has laid out several possibilities for a front-end
challenge to the policy, including due process challenges to aspects of
the one-strike system that were not before the Rucker Court." Stinson
has suggested challenging the no-fault policy because it gives PHAs the
authority to determine guilt based on essentially any type of information
and any type of process, without any oversight, all of which likely leads
46to incorrect eviction decisions. Stinson also argues that the Rucker
Court inappropriately treated HUD as a private landlord, applying
normal contract principles that govern leases when, in fact, there is "no
bargained for exchange" in public housing leases dictated by HUD.47 In
this way, the Court avoided evaluating the federal no-fault policy within
the excessive fines portion of the Eighth Amendment, under which such
a policy would likely have been questionable." A third due process ar-
gument that Stinson puts forth is based on the fact that drug-related
evictions are exempted from normal PHA grievance procedures, so ten-
ants must obtain counsel and go to court to challenge them. This is an
"often insurmountable barrier" for the extremely poor tenants affected;
as a result, they are essentially denied any right to be heard.
Another, somewhat different approach suggested by Stinson is a
challenge under the FHA. Stinson explains that since the no-fault evic-
tion policy disproportionately affects minorities, one could bring a
disparate impact claim under 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a), the portion of the
FHA that makes it unlawful to "make unavailable or deny ... a dwelling
43. Mock, supra note 22, at 1522-23.
44. Id.
45. Stinson, supra note 10, at 458-66.
46. Stinson, supra note 10, at 459.
47. Id. at 461.
48. Id. at 462.
49. Id. at 463-64.
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to any person because of race."o Stinson points out that many courts
recognize that proof that a facially neutral policy has a discriminatory
effect is sufficient to make out a prima facie case that the FHA has been
violated." After developing this theory a bit, however, he concludes that
this type of argument faces very difficult barriers to success.52 I will flesh
out his concerns in the next section, where I will also argue that this sort
of disparate impact claim actually has great potential as a way to chal-
lenge the federal policy on drug-related evictions as discriminatory based
on sex.
V. SEx DISCRIMINATION AS A NEW ANGLE OF ATTACK
I have been unable to find an author who has approached a chal-
lenge to the no-fault drug eviction problem from the angle of sex
discrimination," despite the fact that even a cursory look at the statistics
about public housing residents shows that this is an area with untapped
potential. It has long been understood by social scientists that the most
impoverished households tend to be female-headed.54 Since residents of
public housing represent the poorest citizens in this country, the most
common family structure existing in public housing likely is female-
headed households.
HUD maintains statistics regarding the percentages of female-
headed households residing in public housing. The Department's
website contains a tool through which users can obtain statistics about
subsidized housing current as of 2000. These statistics reveal that, in
2000, 77% of households in public housing nationally were female-
50. Id. at 466-67 (citing Discrimination in the Sale or Rental of Housing and Other
Prohibited Practices, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2006)).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 469.
53. At least two authors have proposed an FHA disparate impact claim based on sex dis-
crimination in the similar context of domestic violence evictions. See Eliza Hirst, The
Housing Crisis for Victims of Domestic Violence: Disparate Impact Claims and other
Housing Protection for Victims of Domestic Violence, 10 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. &
POL'Y 131, 139-48 (2003); Kristen M. Ross, Eviction, Discrimination, and Domestic
Violence: Unfair Housing Practices Against Domestic Violence Survivors, 18 HASTINGS
WOMEN'S L.J. 249, 264-68 (2007) (reviewing cases mounting an FHA sex discrimi-
nation challenge based on domestic violence evictions).
54. See Suzanne M. Bianchi, Feminization & Juvenilization of Poverty: Trends, Relative
Risks, Causes, and Consequences, 25 ANN. REV. OF Soc. 307, 307-09 (1999) (explain-
ing that the term "feminization of poverty" was coined by Diana Pearce in 1978 for
the phenomenon that women have made up an increasingly large proportion of the
American poor).
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headed." The site's statistics do not specify whether the females heading
these households are the official leaseholders of the public housing units
they occupy, but it is a fair inference. In some geographical areas the
percentage of female-headed households is actually significantly higher
than the national figure. For example, eight states come in over the 80%
mark, including Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi, and Delaware at 83%,
North and South Carolina each at 85%, and Virginia and Louisiana
each at an overwhelming 86%.6 Interestingly, it is not just these eight
states pulling the national average up, since thirty-six states and the Dis-
trict of Columbia all fall between 70% and 80%.. Only six states come
in under 70%, and only one of those, Hawaii, is under 60%.
HUD does not maintain statistics on its website about who is actu-
ally affected by the no-fault eviction policy, but given that the
overwhelming majority of leaseholders in public housing are women, it
should follow that the overwhelming majority of tenants evicted under
the policy are women. Coverage of this problem in the press also indi-
cates that women are disproportionately affected by the policy. A 1992
New York Times article profiling a woman in court fighting to remain in
her home after her son was arrested for possessing crack, notes that "[i]n
the waiting room [was] a succession of frazzled women, none willing to
be identified, with similar problems."" A piece that ran in the Buffalo
News in 2002 featured a woman who was evicted from her home, along
with her four children, because her sixteen-year-old son was found in
possession of crack cocaine and marijuana. 0 In an even more egregious
case covered in the San Jose Mercury News the same year, a mother was
evicted when her son was found with a drug pipe, despite the fact that
55. HUD User Data Sets, A Picture of Subsidized Households-2000,
http://www.huduser.org/picture2000/index.htm (last visited Mar. 14, 2009) (follow
"Click Here to Start a Query" hyperlink; follow steps to select "U.S. total" for "Geo-
graphic Summary Level"; "Public Housing" for "Programs"; and "pct-femalehead"
for "Variables").
56. Id. (follow "Click Here to Start a Query" hyperlink; follow steps to select "State" for
"Geographic Summary Level"; highlight and select all states listed for "States"; select
"Public Housing" for "Programs"; and "pctjfemale-head" for "Variables").
57. Id.
58. Id. The six states with percentages of female-headed households in public housing
under 70% are Hawaii, Idaho, Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Wash-
ington.
59. Douglas Martin, Innocent People Lose Homes: Law's Strange Twist, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
11, 1992, at B3.
60. Emma D. Sapong, Public Housing Tenants Evicted on 'One-Strike' Rule Cry Foul,
BUFFALO NEWS (N.Y.), Apr. 8, 2002, at Al, available at 2002 WLNR 1521424.
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61
she had previously kicked him out of the family home. Interestingly,
three of the four plaintiffs in Rucker fit this description as well: "two
were grandmothers . . . whose grandsons were caught smoking mari-
juana in the parking lot of their complex," and Ms. Rucker herself was
an older woman whose mentally disabled daughter was found with co-
caine a few blocks from her home.62
VI. DISPARATE IMPACT CLAIMS UNDER THE FAIR HOUSING ACT
While the Supreme Court has not definitively settled the matter,
there is a strong consensus among the lower federal courts that the
FHA's prohibitions apply to practices that produce a discriminatory ef-
fect, even if a housing provider does not demonstrate an intent to
discriminate.6 ' A claim brought under this "disparate impact" theory
seeks to show, under one of the substantive provisions of the FHA, that
a "policy, procedure, or practice specifically identified by the plaintiff
has a significantly greater discriminatory impact on members of a pro-
tected class" than on others.6 The policy or practice being challenged
must be neutral on its face, and it must not be purposefully applied in a
discriminatory manner, since, if either of these is true, the claim would
b f. . . . . 65be one of intentional discrimination.
The courts rely on a burden-shifting framework in disparate impact
cases, focusing on two key questions: (1) whether the impact of the de-
fendant's policy or practice is significantly greater on a class of persons
protected by the FHA, and, if a prima facie case is made, (2) whether
the defendant can justify its policy sufficiently to overcome it. For a
plaintiff to make out a prima facie case of discrimination, she must
show, almost always through statistical evidence, that the defendant's
policy or practice produces significant discriminatory effects.6 ' Not every
61. Ben Winograd, Teen's Pipe May Cost Family Its Apartment, SAN JOSE MERCURY
NEWS, June 10, 2002, at IB, available at 2002 WLNR 1871248; see also Bob Kerr, A
Son's Bad Decisions Hit Home, PROVIDENCE J.-BULL. (R.I.), Aug. 25, 2002, at 1,
available at 2002 WLNR 5504494 (profiling a woman who faced eviction because
her son was in possession of marijuana without her knowledge).
62. Austin, supra note 33, at 278.
63. ROBERT G. SCHWEMM, HOUSING DIscRIMINATION LAW AND LITIGATION § 10:4, at
10-28 to -29 (2008), available at HDISLL § 10:4 (Westlaw).
64. SCHWEMM, supra note 63, § 10:6, at 10-42 to -43, available at HDISLL § 10:6
(Westlaw) (citing Simms v. First Gibralter Bank, 83 F.3d 1546, 1555 (5th Cir.
1996)).
65. Id. at 10-6 to -8.
66. Id. at 10-44, -47.
67. Id. at 10-44.
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housing practice that produces a discriminatory effect is unlawful; the
degree to which a practice impacts a protected class is relevant in deter-
mining whether a prima facie case has been made." However, the courts
have not come up with a clear mathematical formula with which to de-
termine whether a plaintiff's statistical evidence has shown a sufficient
. ..69discriminatory effect.
Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, the
burden then shifts to the defendant to justify its policy or practice. The
specifics of this burden are described differently by the various circuit
courts. In cases involving private defendants, courts have most often
required a sufficiently strong showing that a defendant's policy or prac-
tice is justified, and at least one court has required that there be no less
discriminatory alternatives available.70 In cases involving public defen-
dants, several circuits have adopted a multifactor approach to assist them
in determining liability.7 ' This approach was originally set out by the
Seventh Circuit in Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. v. Village of
Arlington Heights, the best known case of its kind. The Arlington Heights
court relied on a four-factor balancing test,72 identifying the factors as
follows:
(1) how strong is the plaintiff's showing of discriminatory ef-
fect; (2) is there some evidence of discriminatory intent,
though not enough to satisfy the constitutional standard of
Washington v. Davis; (3) what is the defendant's interest in tak-
ing the action complained of;73 and (4) does the plaintiff seek
to compel the defendant to affirmatively provide housing for
members of minority groups or merely to restrain the defen-
dant from interfering with individual property owners who
wish to provide such housing.
68. Id. at 10-45 to -47.
69. Id. at 10-48 to -49.
70. Id. at 10-49.
71. Id. at 10-49 to -50.
72. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th
Cit. 1977).
73. A full-scale analysis of the different approaches taken by the courts in FHA disparate
impact cases is beyond the scope of this paper. I will analyze a potential sex discrimi-
nation challenge to the federal no-fault eviction policy under the Arlington Heights
approach, assuming that a public defendant would only need to show, under the
third factor, that its policy or practice was within the ambit of its authority. And,
since it was not mentioned in the Arlington Heights case, that it would not necessarily
also need to show that its practice was the least discriminatory option.
74. Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d at 1290.
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In most disparate impact cases brought under the FHA, courts generally
hold that defendants have failed to satisfy their burden of proof.7
VII. THE ARLINGTON HEIGHTS ANALYSIS
Paul Stinson goes through an Arlington Heights analysis regarding a
potential claim of race discrimination and seems to have a generally pes-
simistic view about its likely success. While a sex discrimination analysis
brings up many of the same issues as a race discrimination analysis, the
differences between the two, especially statistics showing a more dispro-
portionate effect on women than on minorities, actually make the sex
discrimination claim more likely to be effective. Thus, there is real po-
tential for a claim of disparate impact based on sex to succeed at the
national level in a lawsuit against HUD. Moreover, such a claim can
certainly be used as a tool to challenge the practices of individual PHAs.
Both race and sex discrimination claims would rely on section
3604(a) of the FHA, which makes it unlawful to "make unavailable or
deny ... a dwelling to any person because of race ... [or] sex." Stinson
believes that the statistics necessary for a plaintiff to make out a prima
77facie case of discriminatory impact would be very difficult to amass.
While he notes that minorities make up a disproportionate percentage
of public housing tenants, he also states that HUD does not keep statis-
tics on drug-related evictions, so they would need to be compiled at the
PHA level." While a plaintiff seeking to bring a disparate impact chal-
lenge to the no-fault eviction policy would need to gather statistical data
regarding the way in which evictions have actually been carried out, the
information currently available, at least with regard to the policy's effects
on women, is certainly a good starting point. In fact, it would likely be
sufficient to get to the discovery phase of a lawsuit, at which point the
burden of gathering eviction statistics from PHAs would become signifi-
cantly easier. Further, the percentage of female-headed households in
public housing, 77% nationally,n is even higher than the percentage of
minority households nationally, 69%,so which makes it more likely that
75. Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d at 1290.
76. Discrimination in the Sale or Rental of Housing and Other Prohibited Practices, 42
U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2006).
77. See Stinson, supra note 10, at 469.
78. Stinson, supra note 10, at 469 & n.213.
79. HUD User Data Sets, supra note 55.
80. Id. (follow "Click Here to Start a Query" hyperlink; follow steps to select "U.S. total"
for "Geographic Summary Level"; "Public Housing" for "Programs"; and "percentage
minority" for "Variables").
312 [Vol. 16:299
VINDICATING THE MATRIARCH
a plaintiff could convince a court that she had made a prima facie show-
ing of discriminatory impact. Since courts usually rely on statistics at
that phase, the worse the discrimination appears statistically, the more
likely a court will be to allow a case to move forward. This is especially
true in some of the states where the percentage of female-headed house-
holds reaches into the high eightieth percentile, and in individual PHAs
where that number might be even higher.
A. Arlington Heights Factor One
Assuming it were possible for a plaintiff to make out a prima facie
case based on the information currently available and statistics of actual
evictions, a defendant's arguments would then have to be analyzed un-
der the Arlington Heights factors. The first factor, the strength of the
plaintiff's showing of discriminatory impact, is very similar to the ques-
tion of whether a prima facie case had been made, since it usually relies
on statistical data. If a plaintiff had succeeded in making out a prima
facie case, this factor would automatically weigh in favor of a finding of
liability. However, the strength of its influence would depend on how
strong the statistics were in a particular case. In a national case against
HUD, as well as in a more local case, the precise percentage of evictions
of women would inform the court as to how much weight to give to this
factor.
B. Arlington Heights Factor Two
The second Arlington Heights factor for determining a defendant's
liability is whether there is some evidence of discriminatory intent.
While the existence of evidence of intent might help persuade a court to
find for plaintiffs, such evidence is not absolutely required."' In addition,
the Arlington Heights court concluded that "this criterion is the least im-
portant of the four factors that we are examining," since the purpose of
a disparate impact case is to allow a plaintiff to make a case without hav-
ing to show discriminatory intent.82 As Stinson explains with regard to
race, in order to show that Congress intended the no-fault policy to
have a discriminatory effect, one would need to scour the legislative his-
tory to learn whether a hidden discriminatory motive was behind the
81. Stinson, supra note 10, at 4 69-70; see also Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d at 1292.
82. Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d at 1292.
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passage of the one-strike laws." Stinson dismisses this factor as an im-
possible hurdle too quickly, though. While it does pose a major problem
for a case against HUD, some authors have argued that the one-strike
laws were largely based on deeply held stereotypes about "welfare moth-
. 84 . ..
ers" and poor minority families, so it is quite possible that some
evidence of discrimination could be discovered.
Factor two is far more likely to work to the advantage of plaintiffs
in a local case against an individual PHA, however, since it would be far
easier to find evidence of intentional discrimination on the part of au-
thority employees. This could be done by examining statements made to
tenants, or through other means. In a case where there was evidence of
intentional discrimination on the part of a PHA, a plaintiff could bring
a claim of discriminatory treatment under the FHA as well as a claim of
disparate impact." However, if there was insufficient evidence of intent
to succeed on the disparate treatment claim, the same evidence could be
used to bolster the disparate impact claim under this second Arlington
Heights factor. It is important to remember, however, that a showing of
intent is not required for a plaintiff to succeed in a disparate impact
case. If the other three Arlington Heights factors weighed strongly in fa-
vor of a finding of liability, a lack of evidence of intent need not prevent
such a finding.
C Arlington Heights Factor Three
The third factor, the interest of the defendant in "taking the action
which produces a discriminatory impact,"" is the factor Stinson consid-
ers fatal to his proposed challenge, since he thinks that HUD and the
PHAs "undoubtedly have a legitimate, compelling interest in evicting
drug users and criminals." 7 Stinson is probably correct that the defense
has a very low burden under this factor in a normal disparate impact
case against a governmental body, since it would only need to show un-
der Arlington Heights that the body was acting within its legitimate
authority." However, there is a strong argument to be made, under the
Rucker decision, that the burden on the defense in a public housing no-
fault eviction case should be higher. The Rucker Court firmly stated
83. Stinson, supra note 10, at 470.
84. See supra text accompanying notes 33-40.
85. See SCHWEMM, supra note 63, § 10:2, at 10-9 to -13, available at HDISLL § 10:2
(Westlaw).
86. Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d at 1293.
87. Stinson, supra note 10, at 470.
88. Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d at 1293.
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that, in these cases, a PHA is "acting as a landlord of property that it
owns, invoking a clause in a lease." 89 Given this, a court might well be
persuaded that the defendants in a challenge to the no-fault eviction
policy should be treated as quasi-private. In that case, the standard for a
private defendant to meet its burden of proof could influence a factor
three determination. Since that standard is generally much higher than
the standard for public defendants"o and may require a defendant to
show that there are no less discriminatory alternatives to a policy or
practice, it would be very hard for HUD to justify its current no-fault
eviction policy, since a long list of less-restrictive alternatives easily
comes to mind.92
There is also a good policy argument that, even if the no-fault evic-
tion policies serve a compelling interest and are within HUD and the
PHA's authority, they should still not be upheld because the one-strike
eviction policy is not actually effective at reducing drug activity in pub-
lic housing. Jim Moye, who has written on the issue, has presented
several reasons why the policy cannot be effective. First, he argues that
the excessive discretion given to PHAs, along with the failure of the
statute to define "engaging" in drug activity, prevents tenants from un-
derstanding exactly what activity might result in their eviction and
prevents PHAs from uniformly and systematically applying the one-
strike policy.93 Another major problem he points out is the policy failure
to reach the drug users and dealers who habitually spend time in the
vicinity of public housing but are not actually residents or guests of resi-
dents." Since problems with the language of the policy prevent PHAs
from systematically excluding residents and guests who contribute to
drug activity, and since the policy cannot curb non-resident drug
89. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 135 (2002).
90. See Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d at 1293.
91. See SCHWEMM, supra note 64, at 10-49 & n.15. Schwemm points out that some Cir-
cuits have adopted the "no less discriminatory alternative" test, while others evaluate
a defendant's showing using a multifactor approach. However, these differences in
terminology matter little, since most cases have held that defendants failed to carry
their burden. Id. at 10-49 to -51.
92. Other easily implementable alternatives include including drug-related evictions in
normal PHA grievance procedures, requiring a PHA to exercise its discretion when
deciding whether to evict, requiring a PHA to consider particular factors in making
its decision, providing an innocent owner defense, and requiring a PHA to utilize one
of the other HUD approved alternatives to eviction as a first solution before eviction
is considered.
93. Jim Moye, Can't Stop the Hustle: The Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment' "One Strike" Eviction Policy Fails to Get Drugs out ofAmerica 's Projects, 23 B.C.
THIRD WORLD L.J. 275, 285-88 (2003).
94. Id. at 288-89.
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activity at all, it cannot be effective at achieving Congress' goal of pro-
viding drug-free public housing communities.
D. Arlington Heights Factor Four
The fourth factor requires an examination of the type of remedy
sought by plaintiffs. The Arlington Heights court explains that when a
plaintiff is trying to compel a governmental body to affirmatively pro-
vide housing, such as by compelling them to construct integrated
housing, courts ought to be reluctant to grant relief; however, if a plain-
tiff seeks to prevent a body from interfering with or denying housing,
relief ought to be granted more readily.95 As Stinson notes, a challenge to
the no-fault eviction policy would fall in the latter category, since in
these cases leaseholders are being denied housing they had already pos-
sessed. This factor, therefore, would always counsel in favor of liability
* - 96in this sort of case.
Stinson is correct that factors one and four would be most favorable
to plaintiffs in a disparate impact challenge to the federal no-fault evic-
tion policy. In fact, given the even higher percentage of female-headed
households in public housing than minority households, the amount of
discrimination occurring under factor one is likely to sway a court more
in favor of plaintiffs in a sex discrimination case than in a race discrimi-
nation one. Stinson also overlooks a strong argument that there ought to
be a higher standard for the defense under factor three in no-fault evic-
tion cases than there is in other FRA claims, due to the way the court in
Rucker characterizes the action of PHAs in eviction situations. Given
these things, a sex discrimination challenge under the FHA based on the
disparate effects of the federal no-fault eviction policy has definite po-
tential as a way to challenge the policy and induce changes that would
make its application fairer.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The harsh federal law and HUD policy on drug-related evictions
from public housing became even more ruthless with the Supreme
Court's Rucker decision in 2002. As a result of that decision, public
housing authorities across the country may evict tenants whose family
95. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1293 (7th
Cir. 1977).
96. Stinson, supra note 10, at 471.
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members, guests, or even one-time visitors engage in drug activity, even
if the tenant had neither knowledge of the activity nor any control over
it. A number of legal scholars have written about the unfairness of this
policy and how it can produce draconian results, despite the Rucker
Court's assurance that the PHAs' discretion would prevent undeserved
evictions. Lawyers and policymakers have thus been looking at possible
ways to challenge or alter the policy. One type of legal claim that had
not previously been explored would challenge the policy as discrimina-
tory based on sex, since a large majority of public housing tenants are
women and it is probably the case that a large majority of the tenants
falling victim to the no-fault eviction policy are women as well.
The Fair Housing Act provides a useful tool through which to
bring a claim, since it allows lawsuits based on the disparate impact of a
housing provider's policy or practice, and does not necessarily require a
showing that such discrimination was intentional. An FHA disparate
impact claim based on sex discrimination has a good likelihood of suc-
cess because the percentage of women leaseholders in public housing is
extremely high. Further, the Rucker Court's treatment of PHAs as quasi-
private landlords counsels in favor of application of a higher standard by
which PHAs must justify their policies.
As the structural foundation of households and communities in
public housing, women are the ones who have the potential to bring
relatives together, keep children safe and off the street, and raise families
that rise above the crime and drug activity that often plagues these very
low-income communities. The federal drug-related eviction policy and
the harsh application of it that the Supreme Court has counseled create
a situation where women are unable to protect and rehabilitate their
children and grandchildren, because doing so might lead to eviction and
therefore the loss of the main resource they had to make a life for their
families. The policy almost certainly has a disproportionate impact on
women. Consequently, a sex discrimination claim under the FHA may
be a tool that lawyers can use to invalidate the entire policy, or at least to
sue individual PHAs and force them to apply it in a fair and just man-
ner. t
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